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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of article 27 is "possible," and the experience of other jurisdic-
tions indicates that such an application is highly desirable.
Billy J. Tauzin
OBLIGATIONS- OFFER MADE IN NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT
Defendant advertised in a local newspaper:
"OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS
"WE WANT enthusiastic, ambitious men to rep-
resent us locally, Professional training program
w/$450.00 monthly guarantee if qualified. En-
thusiasm and ambition quickly rewarded with ad-
vancement. Be in the four figure bracket. For ap-
pointment call Mr. Johnson, 357-9756 before 1 p.m.
daily."1
In response to the advertisement, plaintiff applied for employ-
ment and was hired as a salesman. After receiving commissions
of $171.84 for the first month and $417.61 for the second, plain-
tiff resigned, and brought suit for $300.00, which he considered
the balance due under his contract at $450.00 per month, less
commissions paid. Defendant urged that the newspaper ad-
vertisement was merely an invitation to the prospective employee
to make an offer and enter into a contract of employment. The
lower court sustained the plaintiff's claim, and on appeal the
First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. Held, the newspaper
advertisement constituted an offer, which, upon acceptance,
formed a binding contract containing the terms of the advertise-
ment. Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965).
The Louisiana Civil Code provides four requirements for a
valid contract: (1) legal capacity to contract, (2) a certain
object, (3) a lawful purpose, and (4) consent legally given.2
Consent, defined as "the concurrence of intention in two or more
persons, with regard to a matter understood by all, reciprocally
communicated, and resulting in each party from a free and de-
1. Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858, 860 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
2. LA. CiviL CODE art. 1779 (1870).
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liberate exercise of the will,"' is an operation of the mind, and
thus must be evinced in a manner to be understood by the parties
to the contract.4 The Code provides that consent is evidenced
by the proposition of one party to the contract and the accept-
ance of the other party.5 Both the offer and the acceptance may
be either express or implied from the circumstances.6
A majority of jurisdictions adopt the view that there is a
presumption against a newspaper advertisement being an offer,
the acceptance of which would form a binding contract.7 The
advertisement is presumed to be a mere invitation to negotiate
because it is usually stated in language too general to lead a
reasonable man to believe an offer is being made.8 However, it
is quite possible for an advertisement to be stated in such a
3. Id. art. 1819.
4. Id. art. 1797.
5. Id. art. 1798.
6. Id. art. 1811: "The proposition as well as the assent to a contract may be
express or implied:
"Express when evinced by words, either written or spoken;
"Implied, when it is manifested by actions, even by silence or by inaction,
in cases in which they can from circumstances be supposed to mean, or by legal
presumption are directed to be considered as evidence of an assent."
7. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 25 (1963) ; 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS § 84 (2d ed.
1920) ; 1 SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 14 (1954) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 27 (3d
ed. 1957). There are no Louisiana cases expressly holding that the presumption
exists; but it is the general rule throughout the country and there seems to be no
reason why it should not prevail in Louisiana also.
8. See Lonergan v. Scolnick, 197 Cal. App. 2d 179, 276 P.2d 8 (1954);
Georgian Co. v. Bloom, 27 Ga. App. 468, 108 S.E. 813 (1921) ; Meridian Star v.
Kay, 207 Miss. 78, 41 So. 2d 30 (1949) ; Ehrlich v. Willis Music Co., 93 Ohio
App. 246, 113 N.E.2d 252 (1952); Craft v. Elder & Johnston Co., 38 N.E.2d
416 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 1941) ; People v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 202 Misc. 229, 115
N.Y.S.2d 857 (Spec. Sess. 1952) ; Lovett v. Frederick Loeser & Co., 124 Misc. 81,
207 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Munic. Ct. 1924).
1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 25 (1963) : "Neither the advertiser nor the reader of
his notice understands that the latter is empowered to close the deal without
further expression by the former."
1 SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 14 (1954) : "Advertisements are normally construed
as invitations for offers, since neither the language used nor the medium of com-
munication is such as to indicate that the advertiser is willing to consider him-
self bound without a further expression of his assent."
Some courts, which do not go so far as to call the advertisement an offer,
will still consider the terms of the advertisement as a "warranty" to a contract
made between the advertiser and the reader. Several recent cases along this line
are: Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965);
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
In the Inglis case the court stated: "The consuming public ordinarily relies ex-
clusively on the representations of the manufacturer in his advertisements. What
sensible or sound reason then exists as to why, when the goods purchased by the
ultimate consumer on the strength of the advertisements aimed squarely at him
do not possess their described qualities and goodness and cause him harm, he
should not be permitted to move against the manufacturer to recoup his loss."
209 N.E.2d at 586.
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manner as to constitute an offer. There are two tests applied
by the courts in determining whether an advertisement is an
offer." One of the tests, suggested by Professor Williston, is
"whether the facts show that some performance was promised
in positive terms in return for something requested."' 10 The other
test, seemingly the preferable one, is "where the offer is clear,
definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation,
it constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will complete the
contract."" The courts indicate these objective tests will be ap-
plied and the advertisements construed against the composers 2
even when the advertisers may not have intended to be bound.13
The attitude of the courts is that men should be held to a reason-
able construction of their manifestations. 14  Davis v. Lacaze
illustrated that this attitude was consistent with the civilian
approach when the court stated that "one cannot make a con-
9. See Johnson v. Capital City Ford, 85 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955)
Schreiner v. Weil Furniture Co., 68 So. 2d 149 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1953) ; Young-
blood v. Daily & Weekly Signal Tribune, 131 So. 604 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930) ;
Sweeten v. Friedman, 118 So. 787 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928); cf. Crummer v.
Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1945); Schmidt v. Marine Milk Condensing Co.,
197 Ill. App. 279 (1915); Seymour v. Armstrong & Kassebaum, 62 Kan. 720,
64 Pac. 612 (1901) ; Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 251 Minn.
188, 86 N.W.2d 689 (1957) ; Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St.
328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922) ; Arnold v. Phillips, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 195 (1846)
Oliver v. Henley, 21 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
10. See, e.g., Crummer v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Salisbury v.
Credit Service, 39 Del. 377, 199 Atl. 674 (1937) ; Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis
Surplus Store, 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d 689 (1957). See also 1 WIASTON,
CONTRACTS § 27 (3d ed. 1957). This test applies best to offers of reward.
11. See Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn. 188,
86 N.W.2d 689 (1957) ; Oliver v. Henley, 21 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
12. See Johnson v. Capital City Ford, 85 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955)
cf. Crammer v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1945).
13. Sometimes advertisers offer merchandise at very low prices solely for the
purpose of getting customers into their places of business and with no intention
of selling the advertised merchandise at the stated prices. This type of advertising
is called "bait" advertising, and states have passed statutes against it. SrmON,
THE LAW FOR ADVERTISING AND MARKETING 404 (1956).
In this regard the court in Johnson v. Capital City Ford, 85 So.2d 75, 81-82
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) stated: "If the defendant seriously argues that despite
the plain wording of the advertised offer, defendant had absolutely no intention
of making a bona fide offer but was merely intending to lure customers to de-
fendant's sales lot, .. . it may be well to recall the expression of the Ohio Su-
preme Court in an almost identical factual situation as reported in Meyer v.
Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118, at page 121, 28
A.L.R. 986, at page 991: 'There is entirely too much disregard of law and truth
in the business, social, and political world of to-day. It is time to hold men to
their primary engagements to tell the truth and observe the law of common honesty
and fair dealing.'"
14. See Johnson v. Capital City Ford, 85 So. 2d 75, 82 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1955) ; Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 'Ohio St. 328, 338-39, 140
N.E. 118, 121 (1922).
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tract and, at the same time, impose upon it the condition of an
uncommunicated 'mental reservation.' "P15
In the instant case the court relied upon a Louisiana case,
Johnson v. Capital City Ford,6 in determining that the news-
paper advertisement was an offer. However, the cases can be
distinguished. In Johnson something was promised in return
for something requested. 17 There was nothing left to be nego-
tiated because the offer stated, in effect, that if anyone pur-
chased a 1954 automobile before a certain date, the offeror would
trade it even for a 1955 model when they were available.'
Another Louisiana case where the court found nothing left to
be negotiated is Sweeten v. Friedman.9 Because the barber in
that case advertised a "permanent wave for $7.60," the court
found that he "had no right to demand more than $7.60 for the
services necessary to attain a complete 'permanent wave'."
2 0
Although the advertisement in the instant case does state, "Pro-
fessional training program with $450.00 monthly guarantee if
qualified,' 21 it cannot be said that there is nothing left to be
negotiated. The prospective employee would certainly want to
know what the job entailed since the advertisement did not indi-
cate the type of training intended. The use of "if qualified"
shows an ambiguity which could only be resolved by negotiation.
The purpose of the appointment referred to in the advertisement
must have been to negotiate these matters. But holding this
advertisement to be an offer, as the court has done, is in effect
saying that any person who read it could bind the advertiser to
pay him $450.00 simply by telling him, "I accept." In a similar
Louisiana case, Jones v. Janes,'22 where the offer was ambiguous,
the court stated: "If an agreement is uncertain it is because the
15. 181 La. 75, 78, 158 So. 626, 627 (1935). See also Laborde v. Aymond,
172 La. 905, 135 So. 913 (1931) ; Pittsburgh & Southern Coal Co. v. Slack, 42
La. Ann. 107, 7 So. 230 (1890) ; Patterson v. Koops, 10 Orl. App. 266 (La. App.
Or. Cir. 1913).
16. 85 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
17. The court said the offer meant, "If you buy a 1954 automobile before
October 1st, I will let you trade it even for a 1955 model." Thus, the court con-
cluded, "[U]ndoubtedly the offeree's purchase of a 1954 model before October 1st
would have been a binding acceptance (without any further discussion) of the
dealer's offer." Id. at 79.
18. The court said the offer "was certain and definite enough to constitute a
legal offer, Articles 1779, 1886, LSA-Civil Code." Id. at 79.
19. 118 So. 787 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
20. Id. at 789.
21. Wilils v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858, 860 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
22. 156 La. 715, 101 So. 116 (1924).
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offer was uncertain or ambiguous to begin with, for the ac-
ceptance is always required to be identical with the offer, or
there is no meeting of the minds and no agreement. '23 It is sub-
mitted that Jones should be controlling and the advertisement
should not be considered an offer the acceptance of which would
form a contract.
Although the court speaks of the advertisement as an offer,
there is some doubt that the court actually construed it as such.
The court said at one point, "when the plaintiff was accepted"24
(emphasis added), while in the same paragraph it said, "he
signified that he had accepted the contract. ' 25 If plaintiff was
accepted, he must have made the offer to work; while if he ac-
cepted, the defendant must have made the offer. It is submitted
that the court meant Allied Insulation made an offer to pay
$450 on the condition that the offeree be accepted for employ-
ment.
In order for the court to reach its decision it was necessary
to find that Allied Insulation reasonably led Willis to believe
that, simply upon the basis of the advertisement, he could bind
them to pay him $450 per month - without anything being said
at the time of entering into the employment. Would not a rea-
sonable man make specific inquiry concerning the salary he was
to receive as a result of the employment? Did not Willis know
he was to work on a commission basis? The court answered
these questions in the negative, feeling justified in giving the
employee the degree of protection his interpretation of the ad-
vertisement required. The court decided the issue by stating
that the advertisement should be construed against the com-
poser.26
Although justice was done in holding that a binding contract
of employment had been made, it nevertheless seems unwise to
extend the rationale of the instant case to advertisements in
23. Id. at 718, 101 So. at 117. See also Laborde v. Aymond, 172 La. 905, 908,
135 So. 913, 914 (1931), where the court stated: "Contracts are founded on the
agreements, not on the disagreements, of the parties. Where they misunderstand
each other, there is no contract."
24. Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858, 861 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
25. Ibid.
26. The court, quoting from the Johnson case, stated: " 'It must further be
remembered that the words of the advertisement were of course chosen by defend-
ant-dealer, and if any ambiguity exists as to their meaning, it must be resolved
against their composer.' " Id. at 861.
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general. If courts continue to assume that the advertisement is
an offer without closely analyzing the individual case, advertisers
will be forced to publish the complete terms of any possible con-
tract which might result from the advertisement. It is submitted
that such a result would be an unreasonable burden. The public
understands that advertisements are deliberately terse to give
the reader a general idea of what is available without having
to state the details of a possible contract. The presumption
against advertisements as offers 2 must be maintained in order
to promote the most efficient communication between the ad-
vertiser and the public.
A. J. Gray, III
SALES-BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE-CREDIT ON
PRE-EXISTING DEBT
Plaintiff-consignor shipped gear equipment to consignee for
sale on plaintiff's account. Consignee transferred part of the
equipment to defendant in what appeared to be a C.O.D. sale
for $1800. Actually, consignee had an unpaid account with
defendant, who credited this account with the value of the equip-
ment, thus cancelling the account. After defendant had sold
the equipment in a subsequent transaction, plaintiff brought
suit to recover the equipment or its value. The trial court
held that the pre-existing debt constituted valuable considera-
tion and that defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. On certiorari,
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. Held, a person who
takes property in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt has not
given valuable consideration and therefore cannot be a bona
fide purchaser for value. Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Epstein,
246 La. 953, 169 So. 2d 61 (1964).
It has generally been held in Louisiana and at common law
that a bona fide purchaser for value is one who parts with new
consideration at the time of his purchase and does not have
prior notice of any adverse interest sought to be enforced against
the property acquired.1 Although there is no uniform pronounce-
27. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
1. Port Fin. Co. v. Ber, 45 So.2d 404, 406 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950), wherein
the court stated: "Louisiana has received the common law concept of bona
fide purchaser into its jurisprudence." Quoting from Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 420,
19661
